


ETHNIC CONFLICTS

THEIR BIOLOGICAL ROOTS
IN ETHNIC NEPOTISM



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Ethnic Conflicts

Their Biological Roots in Ethnic Nepotism

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Preface

Different ethnic groups have tended to conflict since the beginning of human history, and the intensity of such conflicts does not seem to have decreased. The universality of ethnic conflict is an interesting problem. Why are ethnic conflicts so common across all civilizational boundaries and over time? I have explored this problem more than 20 years on the basis of an idea that because of the universality of ethnic conflict, we should seek its roots from our common human nature. I have argued that the evolutionary roots of ethnic conflict can be traced to our evolved disposition to ethnic nepotism; in other words, to our disposition to favor and align with relatives in conflict situations. This book represents my latest attempt to test the idea of ethnic nepotism by empirical evidence. I am attempting to explore to what extent a measure of ethnic nepotism (ethnic heterogeneity) is able to explain the great variation in the nature and extent of ethnic conflicts in the world. I want to emphasize that my intention is not to seek a complete explanation for the variation in the extent of ethnic conflicts; I focus on the explanatory power of ethnic nepotism. I try to explore to what extent and in which cases ethnic nepotism provides a satisfactory explanation for the variation in the measure of ethnic conflicts, but I pay attention also to the impact of some other factors.

The book is divided into eight chapters. The research problem and theoretical arguments are formulated and discussed in Chapter 1, in which some studies of ethnicity and ethnic conflict as well as of theoretical explanations are reviewed. In the end, a theory of ethnic nepotism is introduced and the basic hypothesis about the causal relationship between ethnic nepotism and ethnic conflict is

presented.

In Chapter 2, empirical variables needed to test the hypothesis about the crucial impact of ethnic nepotism on the extent and intensity of ethnic conflict will be defined. The definition of empirical variables makes it possible to transform the basic hypothesis into testable research hypotheses. They are formulated at the end of Chapter 2. Empirical data on the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts and on the level of ethnic heterogeneity are given in Appendixes 1 and 2.

In Chapter 3, the research hypotheses are tested by empirical evidence on dependent and explanatory variables. Correlation analysis is used to test the hypotheses, and the results are complemented by multiple correlation analysis. The purpose is to see to what extent the measure of ethnic nepotism and some alternative explanatory variables are able to explain the global variation in the measure of ethnic conflict.

The results of correlation analysis will be complemented by regression analysis carried out in Chapter 4. Regression analysis is used to disclose how well the average relationship between the measure of ethnic nepotism and the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts applies to single countries. The results show which countries are clustered around the regression line and which ones deviate clearly from the regression line and contradict the research hypothesis most clearly. Regression analyses of EEC on HDI-2010 and ID-2010 are used to illustrate the explanatory powers of human development and the level of democratization.

The results of regression analysis of EEC on EH for single countries will be discussed in chapters 5, 6, and 7. The purpose is to describe the nature of ethnic heterogeneity and of ethnic conflicts in each of the 176 countries in greater detail than in the appendixes 1 and 2. For this purpose, the 176 countries of this study are divided into three main categories on the basis of the residuals produced by the regression analysis. In Chapter 5, the

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countries around the regression line are briefly discussed. These countries support the hypothesis most clearly. In Chapter 6, the countries with moderate positive or negative residuals are discussed, and in Chapter 7, the countries with large residuals are discussed. Attention will be paid to exceptional local factors which seem to be related to deviating cases. I attempt to find out what local or other particular factors might explain their significant deviations from the regression line.

In Chapter 8, the results of statistical analyses and country reviews are summarized and conclusions on the basis of the results of empirical analyses are made. The main conclusion will be that because the measure of ethnic nepotism used in this study explains more than half of the global variation in the extent of ethnic conflicts across all civilizational and developmental boundaries, and because the evolutionary roots of ethnic nepotism are in our common human nature, it would be unrealistic to expect the disappearance, or even a decrease, of ethnic conflict and violence from the world. On the other hand, because several countries deviate to positive or negative directions from the regression line, the escalation of ethnic conflicts into ethnic violence cannot be regarded to be inevitable. Various political failures have often been behind the escalation of ethnic violence, and, on the other hand, by appropriate policies and institutional arrangements it has been possible to prevent the eruption of ethnic violence even in some ethnically highly divided societies. Therefore, it is an exciting and important task for social scientists to explore what kinds of policies and institutions might be best suited to accommodate ethnic interest conflicts in particular countries and situations. The results of this study provide some hints about the means to accommodate ethnic interest conflicts.